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Introduction 
Nancy Staudt* 
Tax scholars have filled the legal literature with fascinating 
debates on theoretical and normative issues. These debates have led 
analysts to offer a wide range of reforms designed to advance their 
views on tax policy questions. Tax analysts, for example, have 
proposed mechanisms to deter the use of tax shelters,1 promote public 
perceptions of tax fairness,2 lead courts to interpret laws in a rational 
and consistent manner,3 and curb partisan auditing procedures in the 
Internal Revenue Service.4 In the abstract, these proposals nearly 
always seem sensible; indeed even conflicting proposals appear 
sound.5 Unfortunately, however, the literature gives legislators little 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I thank Peter Weidenbeck 
for his thoughtful comments on this essay. 
 1. Peter Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business 
Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 41, 69-70 
(2001) (exploring the market for tax shelters and proposing mechanisms to curb it). 
 2. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781 (2001) (investigating social norms and their role for improving tax compliance). 
 3. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 871-87 (1991) (investigating trends in 
statutory interpretation and proposing that courts give substantial weight to tax legislative 
history that explains the legislation in question, but significantly less weight to legislative 
history that assumes an additional quasi-regulatory role). 
 4. Frederic G. Corneel, The Service and the Private Practitioner: Face to Face and 
Hand in Hand—A Private Practitioner’s View, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 343, 343-65 (1994) 
(identifying problematic IRS procedures and proposing improvements).  
 5. Compare Canellos, supra note 1 (proposing disclosure requirements and high 
penalties to discourage the use of the tax shelters), with David Wiesbach, Business Purpose, 
1 
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guidance for selecting one proposal from another in the wide array of 
sound policy options. 
This lack of guidance is associated with the fact that tax analysts 
often fail to assess the observable implications of their theories 
against empirical data. In short, while tax scholars freely opine on 
important issues of tax policy, few attempt to test whether their 
hypotheses hold true in the real world. Consider the following: over 
the course of the last decade, Lexis has electronically published 
roughly 2000 tax-related articles and essays.6 Just 21% of this pool 
mentioned the word “empirical,”7 and 1% were in fact empirical 
studies.8 Yet, many, if not most, of the authors make empirical claims 
 
Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax: The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach to 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 79-82 (2001) (advocating anti-shelter doctrines for discouraging 
tax avoidance). 
 6. A Lexis search of all articles written between 1993 and 2002 mentioning the terms 
“tax or taxation” in the title produced 1,972 articles. This search, of course, may be under-
inclusive given that articles addressing taxation issues may not use the terms “tax” or “taxation” 
in the title. For example, Leandra Lederman has studied settlements in the context of tax court 
cases but this article was not included in my search. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to 
Trial: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315 
(1999). 
 7. Out of the 1,972 tax-related articles, 422 mention the term “empirical” either in the 
title or the text. 
 
 8. Using a very broad definition of “empirical,” a definition that includes virtually all 
articles in which the author collected data (but did not necessarily analyze via statistical tools), I 
identified 22 empirical studies in the extant tax literature published between 1993 and 2002, 
including: Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737 
(1993) (collecting data on tax responsiveness of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley start-ups); Daniel K. Benjamin & William R. Dougan, Efficient Excise Taxation: The 
Evidence from Cigarettes, 40 J.L. & ECON. 113 (1997) (study of cigarette taxes and the “ripple 
effect”); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint 
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997) (using census data to analyze marriage 
penalties); Paul L. Caron, The Federal Tax Implications of Bush v. Gore, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
749 (2001) (systematic study of federal court cases citing Supreme Court opinion in 
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch); Paul L. Caron, The Federal Courts of Appeals’ Use of State 
Court Decision in Tax Cases: “Property Regard” Means “No Regard”, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 443 
(1993) (systematic study of federal appellate cases citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch); 
David N. Figlio & Arthur O’Sullivan, The Local Response to Tax Limitation Measures: Do 
Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 233 (2001) 
(containing a study of cities subject to tax limits and the corresponding budget manipulations); 
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995) 
(exploring the legislative costs associated with relying on distributional tables to make tax 
policy rather than more qualitative information); Richard A. Ippolito, Reversion Taxes, 
Contingent Benefits, and the Decline in Pension Funding, 44 J.L. & ECON. 199 (2001) 
(collecting and analyzing data on defined benefit plans and the minimum funding approach to 
private pensions); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/2
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about individual behavior and institutional decision making in an 
attempt to convince readers (and possibly legislators) of a particular 
view on tax policy.9  
In this symposium we seek to move beyond theoretical and 
normative tax policy debates to study the real world effects of 
taxation. The contributors use a variety of empirical methods to shed 
new light on a range of complex tax issues. Although the articles in 
this collection will not settle long-standing debates—some studies 
raise more questions than they answer—we believe that empirical 
work is necessary for finding and implementing workable solutions 
to difficult tax problems. This does not mean we see no role for 
theorizing in taxation. Just the opposite is true. We hope to subject 
 
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993) (investigating intra-family 
resource allocation through survey data); Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-Confiscatory 
Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REV. 905 (1996) (collecting 
historical data on progressivity debates); Gil B. Manzon & George A. Plesko, The Relation 
Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, 55 TAX L. REV. 175 (2002) 
(collecting data on taxable income through publicly available financial statements); James 
Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of 
Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351 (1999); Jeffrey Milyo, Electoral and 
Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget 
Reform, The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Money Committees in the House, 40 J.L. & ECON. 
93 (1997) (study of legislative committees and correlative powers); Kathryn L. Moore, State 
and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171 (1997) (study of 
congressional activity in state and local tax area); Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The 
Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax Decisions, 39 HOW. 
L.J. 841 (1996) (engaging a systematic study of Supreme Court decision making in the Burger 
era); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraints on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 
(2001) (analyzing tax costs associated with particular tax planning devices); David M. Schizer, 
Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1339 (2000) (investigating effect of Treasury regulations on tax planning); Daniel M. 
Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 473 (2002) (analyzing connections between federal tax outcomes and judges’ social 
backgrounds); Daniel M. Schnieder, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory 
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001); Daniel M. Schneider, 
Interpreting the Interpreters: Assessing Forty-Five Years of Tax Literature, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 
483 (1999) (investigating the tax literature for purposes of understanding trends in “tax 
culture”); David Schultz, State Taxation of Interstate Commuters: Constitutional Doctrine in 
Search of Empirical Analysis, 16 TOURO L. REV. 435 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, James 
Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and 
Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993) (analyzing data on tax expenditure budge and 
campaign contributions) 
 9. The authors in this symposium are certainly subject to this criticism. See, e.g., Nancy 
C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 554 (2002) (arguing that 
taxpayer status is a means by which individuals gain a voice in political debates).  
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the best theories to empirical investigation in order to understand 
better their real-world implications, and ultimately their viability for 
policy making.10 Without theory, empiricism is merely a mechanism 
to describe the existing state of the world; informed by theory, we 
can use empirical methodologies to assess likely behavioral 
consequences of legal change can evaluate tax policy over the course 
of time. 
The participants in this symposium are not the first tax scholars to 
recognize the importance of empirical work. Many scholars 
acknowledge that without data they cannot “prove” their thesis but 
can only offer “plausible assumptions” and cite to anecdotal evidence 
in making arguments about the tax laws.11 In an attempt to move 
beyond “plausible assumptions” and into “definitive answers,” some 
tax scholars cite existing empirical studies (or the lack thereof) in an 
effort to bolster their arguments,12 but few have undertaken original 
 
 10. We agree with Marjorie E. Kornhauser’s argument that “the dismissal of theory and 
exaltation of empirical studies is unwarranted,” both are exceedingly important to good tax 
policy making. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the 
Progressive Income Tax, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 151 (1997) (taking issue the vocal critics of “tax 
theory”). 
 11. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 
1865 (1994) (“the proof of this point ultimately lies in empirical work yet to be done, and which 
I hope to help develop further in the future.”); Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive 
Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 383 (1995) 
(“Another problem that may have arisen as a consequence of Burke is that employment disputes 
that might have been settled may instead be channeled to the courts in the hope of having 
settlements characterized as excludable tort damages. The author has no empirical evidence that 
this has occurred, but accounts of such occurrences are circulating among some law firms.”); 
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1627, 1672 (1999) (“This section considers some additional examples of efficient line 
drawing to show that the approach is workable. The goal is to illustrate the recommended 
approach rather than to provide definitive answers to these problems. In particular, empirical 
research is necessary to determine the appropriate answers, and this section includes only what I 
hope are plausible assumptions.”); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of 
Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507 (1998) (“My 
conclusions in this Part rest on theory and anecdotal evidence and thus are preliminary. 
Nevertheless, this study lays the foundation for further empirical analysis.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and 
Institutional Choice, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996) (drawing on a range of empirical studies 
found in the economic literature for purposes of understanding women’s labor force 
participation); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the 
Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 221 (1995) (“a 
persuasive, utilitarian argument can be made that the benefits afforded individuals rise less than 
does their income, thus supporting regressivity, rather than progressivity. This author knows of 
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empirical research as a component of their scholarly agenda.  
Of course, traditional legal scholars tend to lack training in social 
science methods and thus need to guard against selective empiricism 
in the service of a normative agenda. Some commentators are 
skeptical that legal policy analysts are capable of avoiding these 
pitfalls and of producing valid empirical research.13 We agree with 
the skeptics that empirical research requires special skills and that 
without such skills we may publish flawed studies that confound, 
rather than clarify, difficult policy questions.14 We also believe that 
empirical research is a key to good tax policy making, and that 
acquiring the skills necessary to collect and analyze data in a 
scientifically rigorous way is essential to equip traditional tax 
scholars with the proper means to find solutions to long-standing 
problems of tax policy. 
Consider Professors William M. Gentry and David M. Schizer’s 
article entitled, Frictions and Tax-Motivated Hedging: An Empirical 
Exploration of Publicly-Traded Exchangeable Securities. In this 
paper, the authors investigate a tax avoidance strategy known as “tax-
free hedging,” transactions that offer the benefits of a sale without 
triggering a realization event. Using publicly available data, the 
authors provide empirical evidence to support their claim that 
frictions (non-tax costs) discourage the use of publicly traded 
securities in these hedging transactions, and thus tax policy makers 
intent on protecting the tax base would do well to focus on private 
over-the-counter transactions. Without the empirical data collected 
and analyzed by these authors, legislators and policy makers may 
adopt strategies intended to deter tax avoidance that do not address 
the hedging activities that are the real threat uncovered by Professors 
Gentry and Schizer.15 
 
no persuasive empirical proof to the contrary”). 
 13. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 833 
(2000) (“Empirical analysis is generally helpful. . . . Nevertheless, there are a number of 
reasons to be skeptical. . . . the capacity of legal policy analysts to do empirical research is 
limited. . . . [and] it would seem to be a mistake to allocate significant effort toward a refined 
question where the prospects of success appear to be dim.”). 
 14. For an in-depth discussion of the problems facing lawyers who undertake empirical 
work, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 15. For example, disclosure requirements and increased penalties may be more successful 
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Confronting issues of fairness, two articles in the collection 
suggest that tax avoidance may have more to do with an individual’s 
perception about reciprocity than conventional economic analysis 
would predict. Professors Christopher C. Fennell and Lee Anne 
Fennel, in their article Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative 
Research Agenda, argue that taxpayers seem to have an aversion to 
paying taxes, an aversion that may be greater than that experienced 
with other types of losses, when they believe that other citizens are 
free riding on their contributions. Put differently, when taxpayers 
perceive a lack of reciprocity they are more likely to view the system 
as unfair and refuse to pay taxes on those grounds. If further 
empirical research (which the authors plan to undertake) supports this 
hypothesis, then Congress could ameliorate tax avoidance at the 
individual level with mechanisms that produce transparency and 
promote wide-spread taxpayer cooperation.  
Professor John T. Scholz, a political scientist who has long 
studied tax compliance issues, also finds that taxpayers’ perceptions 
of fairness impact their willingness to pay. In Contractual 
Compliance and the Federal Income Tax System, Professor Scholz 
first presents a theoretical framework for understanding why people 
pay taxes, and then argues that the American tax system has, in fact, 
developed in a manner that is consistent with his theory of 
“contractual compliance.” Professor Scholz then notes that empirical 
studies (including his own) support his model of compliance, and at 
the same time suggest a variety of reforms that could further 
cooperation without excessive government coercion. Professor 
Scholz concludes by noting that these alternative approaches would 
not interfere with democratic values associated with individual rights. 
Finally, four articles explore judicial decision making in the 
context of taxation. In Exploring the “Myth of Parity” in State 
Taxation: State Court Decisions Interpreting Public Law 86-272, 
Professor Bradley W. Joondeph notes that state and local tax lawyers 
routinely claim that the Tax Injunction Act (an Act that bars federal 
courts from hearing state and local tax lawsuits) produces biased and 
unfair outcomes. Their arguments rest on the hypothesis that state 
 
 
than broad anti-shelter doctrine for deterring tax-free hedging transactions. See Cannellos, 
supra note 1; Weisbach, supra note 5.  
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court judges are reluctant to strike down a state tax, even when it is in 
violation of federal law, because of the possible incentive to direct 
revenue into their own state coffers. To test this theory, Professor 
Joondeph collects every state court decision concerning Public Law 
86-272, a federal statute that provides businesses with immunity from 
state income taxes when they keep their activities beneath a specific 
threshold. If state courts allowed immunity under the federal law then 
the argument that the state judges are biased would not hold. While 
his empirical findings are preliminary, Professor Joondeph believes 
his data do not support the assertion that state courts systematically 
disfavor taxpayers claiming protection under federal law. 
Professors Robert M. Howard and David C. Nixon, two political 
scientists, investigate the role that federal courts have in directing 
IRS audit policies. Using cross sectional time series data from 1960 
through 1988, the authors show that the IRS shifts its audits between 
business and individuals in response to the prevailing median 
ideology of the federal courts of appeals. Their essay, Local Control 
of the Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the 
Internal Revenue Service, asserts that as the median federal court of 
appeals judge becomes more liberal, the IRS shifts its audit policy in 
that region to focus on business entities, and as the median appeals 
court judge becomes more conservative, the IRS increases individual 
audits. Professors Howard and Nixon’s work has a strong and 
unexpected implication for scholars interested in IRS auditing 
policies and procedures, namely that effective reform must take into 
consideration the ideology of the federal judiciary, not simply the 
preferences of bureaucratic decision makers.  
In Statutory Construction in Federal Appellate Tax Cases: The 
Effect of Judge’s Social Backgrounds and of Other Aspects of 
Litigation, Professor Daniel M. Schneider explores the impact of 
social backgrounds on federal appellate court judging. In particular, 
Professor Schneider considers whether characteristics such as gender, 
race, or education affect judges’ methods chosen for interpreting the 
tax code. Although normative debates on the importance of social 
background and judging abound, Professor Schnieder’s work 
suggests that a judge’s social background characteristics may not 
have a strong correlation with the method a judge uses to decide a 
case. His findings therefore may have important implications for 
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contemporary debates on diversity and federal judicial appointments. 
Finally, Professors Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck and I explore 
judging in the Supreme Court context. In our essay, Judging Statutes: 
Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the 
Internal Revenue Code, we seek to understand what leads Supreme 
Court Justices to particular outcomes in taxation cases. The 
conventional wisdom among political scientists is that outcomes are 
the product of the Justices’ efforts to advance their political 
ideologies, either by voting in accordance with their own sincerely 
held preferences, or via strategic decisionmaking that takes into 
account the behavior of other relevant actors (to a avoid 
congressional override, for example). The empirical literature on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of statutes, however, is largely based 
upon civil rights cases. We question whether the same results obtain 
in more economically oriented lawsuits, such as taxation. Indeed one 
of our preliminary findings suggests that Supreme Court decisions in 
tax controversies may be tied as much to the level of the national 
deficit as to individual ideology or concerns about congressional 
responses to particular decisions. Although our essay raises more 
questions than it answers, it explains the objectives and methodology 
of a comprehensive empirical study of Supreme Court tax decisions 
that is now underway. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/2
